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"Putin has already won one battle against West": interview with Lithuania's former Minister of Foreign Affairs

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Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2020-2024 Новина оновлена 21 січня 2025, 18:55
Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2020-2024. Фото Фото: Delfi

Landsbergis believes that it is still possible to deal with the "nuclear bully" Putin.

Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2020 to 2024, is one of Ukraine's most steadfast advocates in the West. Unlike many foreign diplomats, all of his public speeches carried a clear message: Ukraine’s victory is the only way to stop Russian dictator Putin once and for all.

What caused the slowdown in support of Kyiv by the allies, what security guarantees the West can offer Ukraine in the event of negotiations with Russia, and what to expect from Donald Trump’s second term as U.S. president — read below in the "Telegraf" interview with the Lithuanian politician.

"We should win the battle of fear and tell Putin,"We are no longer afraid"

— Mr. Landsbergis, we are speaking on the eve of Donald Trump's inauguration. It's no secret that discussions about potential peace talks between Ukraine and Russia and the possibility of pushing Kyiv towards negotiations with Moscow have intensified. It's interesting to hear your opinion on how events might unfold for Ukraine this year, and what Trump's next term might bring.

— Like many people in Ukraine, I was quite worried about President Trump's idea of peace in 24 hours.

It was very difficult to imagine how that situation would work without some major, even existential concession made by Ukraine. When it was announced that it would take at least six months or more, without even specifying a date, it told me that people are really preparing and are fully aware of how difficult the task before them. Basically, I can agree with most of the messages that we're hearing from the incoming advisors of President Trump.

Peace can only come through strength. And strength in this situation means Ukrainian strength. It gives me hope that we might see something that would actually change the situation of Ukraine, allowing Ukrainians to show a very different position on the battlefield, and then connect that to the negotiating table.

President Zelenskyy put it very well when he said that Ukraine is ready to seek peace. It is always ready to seek peace but peace cannot mean capitulation. It's clear that the weak position and capitulation of Ukraine does not work for anybody, neither for Ukraine, nor for Europe, nor for President Trump. So let's give it some time, do what we've always done, push for more, and hope for the best at this point.

— We've seen that over the last three years, Ukraine has been given enough weapons to defend itself, but not enough to achieve a breakthrough or a military victory. So what can change this approach of "managing the escalation" to an approach of "peace through strength" by Europe, the U.S., and the West overall?

— I think that Putin won one very specific battle. He won the battle of instilling fear in our minds.

This became clear at the end of 2022 when Putin declared that the fall of his army in Ukraine could constitute a need for Russia to use a nuclear weapon. This shocked the Western allies and slowed down their support. That’s where the strategy of "we cannot allow Ukraine to win, because if Ukraine wins and Russia loses, then it's nuclear war" comes from.

Frankly, it's a great victory for Putin. He has won a battle of fear against the President of the United States and the leaders of the most powerful countries in Europe. Nobody was able to stand up to him and say, "There are things that will be done to you if you decide to use a nuclear weapon."

If we say that the strategy of the last three years has not been the right one, then we need a change. We start by winning the battle of fear and saying to Putin, "We are no longer afraid. This is what we're going to do to you if you escalate."

— I like how you called Putin a "nuclear bully". That's the right definition for him. We need a recipe for how to punish this bully.

— Yes.

NATO is the best security guarantee, but there is one more option

— There are ongoing debates about possible security guarantees the West could offer Ukraine if negotiations with Russia begin. So what could it be? Could Ukraine finally get an invitation to join NATO? Or maybe it's more about a peacekeeping contingent?

— I've always been advocating that the most efficient security guarantee and the cheapest for the allies is NATO’s Article 5. Because it's a whole package. You get conventional guarantees, which means that in the event of an intervention your country will be defended by the allies. You also get nuclear guarantees, which is very important. We must not forget that.

If a country brings the contingent, but says, "OK, nuclear is up to you", how can a state like Ukraine, which gave up such a weapon in the early 90s for security guarantees, remain secure when the main enemy is always bullying or threatening with nuclear weapons? It's impossible, isn't it? So you need a package. And NATO is that package.

Again, some people in the West have this mindset that NATO is a red line for Putin. And we have to be careful about that. And we have to worry about what Putin thinks. They want to somehow help Putin not to worry too much.

So in this scenario, we have to find something else. Okay, let's look at historical examples. These examples are not the same, but something in that direction is countries that are not part of NATO but have the U.S. as their ally and security guarantee provider. It's South Korea and Japan. There are a couple of things about that. First of all, the U.S. must provide a nuclear umbrella. That the weapon used against these countries is like a weapon used against the United States, and the U.S. would retaliate. And secondly, you have to have a very substantial U.S. contingent in those countries.

We would be talking about 30,000 troops close to the border, ready to defend Ukraine from the first second. It's not theoretical. This is not just a paper agreement. This is a real commitment.

At the early stages of new peace, if we imagine that happening, we need that immediately to be provided. My main worry is that if our allies think they can give paper guarantees, some sort of "just be safe out there" document, it will be broken the next day.

I try to remind people that Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 were agreements of that kind. You push, the country has nowhere to go and accepts terms. The next day Putin starts shooting. He starts blaming Ukraine and then he attacks again. So there's no reason why this scenario can't be repeated if we don't act seriously this time.

— I lived in Donbas, in the city of Pokrovsk, until 2022. So I witnessed how Russia violated the ceasefire every time.

— I visited Donbas number of times. I was in the European parliament after the first war in Ukraine started. Then I was in opposition [in the Lithuanian parliament] and visited the contact line to inform the people of Lithuania on the situation.

Once I was brought to a place where there had been shooting. It happened at night, and in the morning we were standing in the same place where the shooting had taken place a few hours earlier. We filmed the aftermath and talked to the people.

I was in the house that had been bombed. It was 2018, I think. The S-300 missile just fell through the roof into the house.

So this is an example of a peace agreement that is not a peace agreement.

"Russia has never paid a price for what it did"

— In Ukraine and the Baltic states, we clearly understand that there can be no real peace with Putin's Russia. I believe that even after some negotiations or a ceasefire, he will stick to his idea of restoring the Soviet Union, controlling Ukraine and other neighbouring countries. Does the West share this view of Russia as an empire that wants to take over all the countries around it?

— That's an excellent question. I think there is some mental flaw in the West's understanding of Russia.

When the Western empires were crumbling, the Soviet Union managed to present itself as anti-imperialist. And perhaps because the Western countries that held the empires felt guilty and were not in a position to call out the Soviet Union and say, "You are exactly the same as we are."

We let the colonies go and they become independent countries and we will pay the price for decades. But the Soviet Union somehow managed to stay out of it. Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and other captive nations were not able to speak out in the same way that the colonies of the West were able to do, right? When we broke free, we were told to be silent again. Because "you cannot criticize Russia or they will get upset."

And I think that allowed this imperialist spirit to remain and grow. And it is part of their mentality because they never paid a price for what they did. Not in the time of Catherine II, not in the time of Stalin or Lenin, not in the time of Putin.

I think we have to call them empire, at least for now. That is what they are.

— History shows that when Russia has lost wars, it has always collapsed. If Russia loses now and Ukraine wins, are Western societies and governments prepared for its collapse? Do they have a plan for how to deal with Russia if it starts to collapse? After all, it is a nuclear state and the situation requires the management from the outside.

— I think it is much more important to stand up for the principle than to manage Russia's future.

Because there is the argument that is usually placed like this, "We have to think about what would happen to Russia. So if Ukraine wins and Russia collapses, then maybe we're in trouble. So that means maybe Ukraine shouldn't win."

The first principle is that Ukraine did not start the war. Ukraine was attacked. Ukraine must be able to defend itself and push Russia out. And whatever happens to Russia is Russia's problem alone. And the sooner they learn the lesson that there is a huge price to pay if you attack your neighbors, the better.

Because if they don't, they're going to keep doing it. And we'll have this imperial reality unfolding before our eyes.

Probably, the most hopeful years of Russia were immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. I use the word 'hopeful' because it didn't materialize in the way the Western idealists had hoped. But who knows? It takes a long time. You know, even take France. Five republics had to change before you had France as it is now. So democracy is sometimes a very long process. The same with Russia.

But to manage it in its current state is to let the danger brew and keep us all in danger. Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia.

One can say it grows like cancer. Now with North Korean involvement in the war, the danger is clearly increased. South Koreans are saying, "Look, we are in danger as well." Taiwan, where I just returned from, uses the same example. They're saying, "We're learning from Ukrainian lessons. We're in a dangerous position."

"Regions begin to "heal" when part of the "axis of evil" is pushed out"

— This "axis of evil" — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea — continues to grow, largely due to Moscow's efforts. Iran and Russia recently signed a new partnership agreement, so the situation is becoming increasingly dangerous.

— I know this may sound controversial, but geopolitically it's not. One country in this "axis of evil" is actually much weaker than it was. It's Iran.

For so long the West has watched how Iran grew its influence in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. And basically all they could do was condemn it one more time. And then Iran grew in a position where it was able to help Russia in the war against Ukraine. What was done? Basically nothing. Some ridiculous sanctions. And why? Because there is hope that we might be able to restore an agreement between the West and Iran to stop its nuclear programme.

But Israel has taken matters into its own hands. I won't go into the methods, but basically the terrorist threat is limited to the point where it has actually started to hurt Iran so much that they are unable to operate in the region. Suddenly you see Syria reviving, and Lebanon electing a president who says Hezbollah will be thrown out of the country. It may be too early to say, so we have to see how it develops.

But you can get a glimpse of the healing of the region when one of the "axis of chaos" countries is pushed out. So imagine if we did something similar with other countries in the "axis of evil". And Ukraine gives us an opportunity to deal with one of them.

— It will also help Belarus become free because Lukashenko's regime will fall without Putin. It's a key to regional security.

— I always remember an example from the Second World War, when Italy and Nazi Germany were inseparable. But when it became clear that the West was united and the Nazis were not doing so well on all fronts, Italy surrendered. They waved the white flag and said, "We don't want to fight anymore."

— I also wanted to ask about another element of the war: we are seeing hybrid attacks by Russia against NATO countries. Sending spies, flying drones, restoring to provocations at sea. Do you think the response of NATO and the West to these actions has been sufficient? And what should the Alliance do to send a clear message to the Kremlin to stop?

— The latest announcement by the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte about the new several ships that are being sent to Baltic Sea to patrol and some measures that will be undertaken is a hopeful signal.

The only question now is whether Putin will take this seriously, whether he thinks it's enough to stop his activities in the Baltic Sea. Because if he doesn't, it will continue.

Why has he continued so far? Because he has understood that there is no pushback. Basically, we're just sitting there watching and discussing what to do about it. I remember the first debate in NATO was more than a year ago about this sort of thing. And it took a year for us to move.

Look, in Taiwan a few weeks ago a cable was cut in the sea. And they asked how we were dealing with it in the Baltic. Because they understand that it is connected. There's no proof that China was behind it, but it's a very similar situation.

If we do not employ measures enough to push back on that in the Baltic Sea, other actors will do the same thing. They're learning and see some moments of weakness, trying to use it in every possible way.

Most of the equipment that has been sent to Ukraine is old

— And one more question. I remember during one of the meetings of foreign ministers in Brussels you spoke about the weapons that NATO has and can supply to Ukraine, but does not do so. Instead, it is sent or sold to other countries. What was it about? What was the reason for the delays in delivering the necessary capabilities?

— Most of the equipment that has been sent to Ukraine is old equipment from all over the world — the US, the UK, France, everywhere. That means the factories are still working. That means they're producing [weapons]. The question is who they are producing for.

I can tell you that there are orders coming from the Gulf, North Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. They are ordering planes, tanks, rocket launchers, and the orders are being delivered.

The biggest fundamental problem in Europe is that we don't see the war against Ukraine as an existential risk. The war has not even reached the level of a COVID pandemic in terms of understanding what we have to do.

There could be several reasons for this. It could be our blindness. That, you know, we believe that the U.S. should be doing the whole thing. It could be that we just want to get it over with as quickly as possible. And for that, it's best that Russia just does its thing and we forget about it. I don't know. But it's actually horrible. There's no other way to say it.

— Is there a different perception of the war in different countries? I mean, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland see it as a direct threat to them. But in Germany, France, maybe Spain or Portugal they see it differently and they have their own problems.

— We have a very clear division. You could say north-south or east-west. It's difficult to be specific because there are several countries that act differently. Take the Netherlands, for example. They are a very strong partner of Ukraine. As much as I've worked with different ministers from the Netherlands, they've all been very strong advocates for Ukraine.

But then there are countries that see it very differently. And I'm not saying that they don't want to help Ukraine. But the understanding of what it actually means and what is at stake is very, very different.