"The Russians are in big trouble. They have mortgaged their future": interview with the U.S. Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodges

Ben Hodges is a retired United States Army officer who served as commanding general of the United States Army Europe. He is a military expert and an unwavering advocate for Ukraine in the West, who maintains an objective view on things. In particular, he openly talks about the problem of the lack of a strategy for Kyiv's victory in the war on the part of key Ukrainian allies.

In the interview of "Telegraf" with Ben Hodges read about the ten-year security agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine, the key tasks of the Ukrainian military for the year, and the problems of Putin's army.

The U.S. and Germany have the exessive fear of escalation

— Earlier President Biden gave limited permission for Ukrainian forces to strike on Russian territory but only across the border. Why are limitations still there, and should we expect any changes in the White House's stance on this?

— I'm glad that the Biden administration finally gave some flexibility to the Ukrainian side to strike targets on the Russian side of the border. But obviously, it's still way too restrictive.

It still gives Russia a huge amount of sanctuary from which they are launching attacks that kill innocent Ukrainians. So I think the administration's policy is still not adequate. There is no legal, moral, or military reason to limit Ukraine's ability to hit targets on the Russian side of the border from which Russians are attacking Ukraine.

I don't know if this policy will change over the next few months. I think it is a reflection of the fact that the administration still has not committed to Ukraine actually defeating Russia. This is still in the misguided policy approach of trying to manage, and prevent escalation. That seems to be the priority. And I think that's driven by an unfounded, excessive fear that Russia might use a nuclear weapon. So we keep limiting ourselves. And I don't see that changing anytime soon, unfortunately.

— It seems like the West still does not have a unified strategy or vision of Ukraine's victory in this war. What are the reasons for this?

— I can't explain that other than the fact that the U.S. and Germany, the two largest, most powerful countries, have this excessive fear of escalation.

They're not evil. They're just wrong. They think that Russia is going to use a nuclear weapon because Ukraine launches an attack across the border and hits a Russian airfield with an American-made weapon or a German Taurus missile, for example. But I think there's no chance that Russia is going to use a nuclear weapon in that situation.

It's the threat of the nuclear weapon that's so effective for them. And because the Russians see that the U.S. and Germany both hesitate on doing things that we know need to be done.

Do not end up like in Afghanistan

— At the same time, France made suggestions for sending trainers to Ukraine. In your opinion, is there any chance that European countries might take a step forward in supporting Ukraine and send training missions here? Or will they also be facing a fear of escalation?

— Of course, every sovereign nation can make its own decisions. It's not up to the U.S. to say "yes" or "no" if France, Netherlands, Denmark, or any other nation that wants to send trainers. And I certainly would not be against any other country sending advisors, trainers, whatever.

But if I was the commander of the armed forces of any country and I was told to provide air defense trainers, technicians, or anyone else, I would still want to know what's the purpose? What is the strategic outcome? Because providing soldiers as trainers is a policy decision. But policy has to be connected to a strategy. What are we trying to achieve here?

Otherwise, this is how you end up like we did in Afghanistan with troops year after year. And then it ends in a catastrophe because we never had a clearly defined objective. And we didn't have agreement from everybody on what that objective was. That's the hard job.

That's the hard part for our civilian leaders to clearly articulate the strategic outcome that they want in such a way that you can then use military, economic or diplomatic means to achieve it.

And then you have to be able to explain it to your population. That's very difficult, but it has to be done. Otherwise, the President or the Prime Minister or the Bundeskanzler can send troops or airplanes, but for what purpose?

— And it brings us back to the question of the lack of a strategy.

— Absolutely. It's clearly in the interest of the United States and Western Europe that Ukraine defeats Russia, that Russia is defeated and driven back to the 1991 border. It's important for our economic prosperity that Europe is prosperous, which means it needs to be stable and secure.

If we want to avoid a conflict between NATO and Russia, we should help Ukraine defeat Russia in Ukraine. Then, of course, the Chinese are watching to see if we are really serious about what we say are our strategic interests and our values. And if they see that we're not serious, then the risk goes up with China in the Pacific region. To me, these are easy things to explain to the American people or the German people and say, "This is why we're going to help Ukraine defeat Russia."

Ukraine has the best army in Europe already

— Going back to the topic of American support. Ukraine and the U.S. signed a bilateral security agreement. What would be the impact of this agreement on American-Ukrainian cooperation? What are like pros and cons of such a document?

— Of course, it's a good thing that the United States has publicly said that we're going to commit to helping Ukraine continue to improve its own capabilities, its own defense industry.

The problem is that nobody should confuse that with a security guarantee. The only real security guarantee is NATO membership.

This is done in the format of an executive agreement that could be canceled by any new president. If Mr. Trump is the president again, and I hope he's not, but if he is, I don't believe that he will automatically discard the agreement because most people realize that most Americans support Ukraine. Most of Congress supports Ukraine and it is in our interest.

I don't think he'll just turn this back, but we don't know. That's part of the problem. In the meantime, we should be doing everything we can to help Ukraine rebuild its defense industry and provide everything that's needed so it can actually win.

— This agreement is considered like a bridge to NATO, as I understand, and it will help to adapt the Ukrainian Armed Forces to NATO standards more.

— Well, I don't know. That's not what's keeping Ukraine out of NATO. Ukraine has the best army in Europe already. So it's not about Ukrainians don't meet NATO standards.

This is 100% about the United States and Germany. Some other countries also are worried that bringing Ukraine into NATO now would automatically lead to a direct conflict between Russia and the Alliance. That's what this is about.

I see it more as leaders are looking for anything that they can do to get as close to membership as possible. So I don't know if "bridge" is an accurate metaphor, but certainly, everything that increases in concrete ways the bilateral relationship is going to be a positive thing.

— Like a temporary measure.

— No, I wouldn't say temporary measure. Let's just assume that Ukraine becomes a member of NATO next year. There would still be a bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine in terms of defense industry, training, education, a variety of different things. So bilateral agreements exist between allies also, they are parallel.

To get rid of the Soviet mentality

— And if we're talking about the situation on the battlefield, in your opinion, what is the main task of the Ukrainian army for this year, and what can help us regain the initiative on the battlefield?

— I think number one is to stabilize the situation so that Ukraine has the time and the opportunity to grow the size of the army, to not just get more troops, but also the institutional infrastructure needed for recruiting, training, and military education.

These are things that have to be created while you're also fighting for survival. So there's always a push and pull between, do you want your best leaders in the fight, or do you need them helping to train the next group?

An essential task that has to be done this year, is to get the institutional, military organized and sustainable path so you can increase the number of units that you have. But that means you have to have a quality recruiting program where people are honest where they talk to young people and say, "Look, we need you to join the military to defend our country. And yes, it's very dangerous. But because it's dangerous, we are not going to send you to the fight until you are properly trained and properly equipped. You're going to be in a good unit that's ready to go fight. But if something happens, you and your family will still be taken care of." That's got to be built this year.

Also this year, more emphasis on the education and training of leaders is needed. Ukraine is not a Soviet Republic anymore. But I think there's still probably a part of the leadership that still has the Soviet mentality of harsh directive leadership, almost like a prison. So instead it should be about using the brains of these incredible women and men of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and allowing them to use initiative.

I know some of that has happened, but there are still some places where you've got residual Soviet thinking. That's got to be eradicated. That's an important task for your Defense Minister, for General Syrskyi, and for all the other leaders. Get rid of every shred of Soviet thinking and unleash the real power of the Ukrainian people.

But that requires education. That requires teaching young leaders how to think critically, how to analyze situations, how to be willing to take a risk versus avoiding mistakes, and how to treat your people. If you want to recruit women and men that are the right talent and intelligence, they have to be confident that they're not going to get treated like prisoners.

This is an important part of it. It's not just about more money. This is about how you treat people. And to me, this is such an important element of leadership.

And then, of course, the defense industry. I'm seeing more and more European and American companies that are starting to move into Ukraine to help develop, to help bring maintenance and production and repair capabilities into the country.

At the same time, while all of these are happening, Ukraine will continue to hammer away at Russian air, land, and sea forces in Crimea. To me, Crimea is the decisive terrain of this war. And Ukraine has to make the peninsula untenable for Russian forces. So hitting Sevastopol, Saky, Dzhankoy, all of these places, is an important part of getting the Russians out of there.

And so now that you've got not only a few Storm Shadow / SCALP EG, but ATACMS, we're seeing the results of that. And the Russians have to keep pulling people out of there because they're going to lose them like they've lost ships.

The other thing is the isolation of Crimea, meaning cutting the bridge, the ferries, and the railroad. And I think that the big bridge will go down when the Ukrainian General Staff and General Budanov are ready. You're already doing a great job of destroying ferries, both military and civilian. The railroad will be easy to cut when it's time. I think a lot of that's going to happen this year.

And then of course, continuing the effort that you're doing so well of hitting deep targets inside of Russia to destroy the oil and gas infrastructure. It has an important psychological effect. It has an important material effect, and it has an important economic effect.

The Russians are in big trouble

— What to expect from the Russian army? I mean, in May, we've seen the attempt to make a breakthrough in the Kharkiv region.

— I've been watching this now for the last couple of years, and I just don't see the Russians having the ability to break through. Even during the period of six months of no U.S. aid coming in Ukraine, Russia could not exploit that effectively.

They barely moved past Avdiivka or Bakhmut in the east. They have not been able to capture Kharkiv, and now Ukrainian forces are getting what they need. So I just don't see the Russians having the ability to achieve a big breakthrough somewhere.

The only thing that they can do is continue launching missiles and drones against innocent civilian people and civilian infrastructure. They'll continue doing that. And because they don't care about the lives of their own soldiers, they will keep pushing untrained troops into these attacks like they're doing now, losing over a thousand a day killed.

That's the old Russian-Soviet way of fighting. As long as Ukrainian defenders have ammunition, they'll be able to stop that.

I think that the Russians are in big trouble. We're all watching their banks. They have serious problems now financially. They absolutely depend on the ability to export oil illegally to China and India to get money. They depend on North Korea, Iran, and China for ammunition, drones and parts. They have mortgaged their future. And I don't think that what they can do now, they can continue beyond next year.

I was happy to see that the U.S. and other countries applying more economic pressure on Russia.

— But while Russia is facing such a large amount of problems, we hear from Russian dictator Putin some talks about negotiations. What are the motives of these statements? And in your opinion, is there any risk of freezing the war because of these Russian talks? Is someone on the West buying on these bluffs and lies?

— I think that he has no interest in actually achieving a negotiated outcome. He would be interested in negotiating if it causes us to hesitate because there will be people that will go like, "Oh, here's an opportunity for negotiation". To allow Russia to keep anything that they've taken to escape any sort of consequences for all that they've done would be a very serious mistake.

And right now, why should the West, why should Ukraine negotiate? For what? On the Russian side, of course, they would love to have a delay, a pause.

But what Putin said was, "We'll negotiate, but it has to be with the realities as they are now", meaning Russia would keep what it has. What kind of a negotiation is that?